

Introduction: Dreams

In the face of the apparently insurmountable challenges of social reality, that in a previous stage drove figures like Romaine Rolland and Antonio Gramsci to speak about the skepticism of intelligence, to which they opposed the optimism of willpower, let us also oppose to it the confidence in imagination, that essentially poetic device.

– Roberto Retamar

The project then is to claim for us, the once-colonized, our freedom of imagination.

– Partha Chatterjee

Of what consequence are Philippine dreams? Shortly after the deposing of the Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos and his family in 1986, a home videotape of a carousing party held on their yacht made the rounds of the same televisions around the world that had just aired the four-day carnival of their fall. 'We are the World,' sang the Marcoses with the gusto and full rhapsodic feeling worthy of this glorious chart-topping World Aid anthem. That video, along with endlessly replayed footage of and jokes about Imelda Marcos's enormous shoe collection, encapsulated for the international audience the ridiculously pompous yet tawdry dreams of the rulers of this third world nation. In this picture of the Marcoses drunk with power, pursuing their delusions of grandeur, the Philippines appears to be a country dominated by misplaced dreams. It is a place of ironic contrasts and tragic contradictions, where politics is a star-studded spectacle set amid the

gamy third world realities of hunger and squalor. A third world place in first world drag.

Of course, the generic image of this place full of ironic juxtapositions is apprehended from a place presumed to be free of such unconscious irony (All the better to appreciate yours, my dear!). To be ironic (a deliberate act) is after all quite different from being in an ironic condition (an unwitting state). The view of the ironies of third world existence comes with a long history of delighting in the contradictions that colonials/traditional peoples represent when they bear the trappings of an alien modernity. In images such as the ubiquitous Masferré photograph of the g-string clad Ifugao man holding a camera, or the generic photojournalist snapshot of a hijab-wearing Muslim woman talking on the cellular phone, part of the delight undoubtedly stems from the inner knowledge on the part of the viewer that that alien modernity in the hands of the ever non-modern is really theirs. Or at least it is one they are already fully familiar with.¹

Contrary to what one might expect, this is not a view held exclusively by past and present colonizers. It is also partially shared by present and wait-listed postcolonials, resident and non-resident, in the new home or the old. They too appreciate the irony of seeing street children in Manila wearing t-shirts with Ivy League university names or first world logos whose references and connotations these urchins cannot possibly understand. They too can appreciate the irony of 'more Filipinos singing perfect renditions of American songs (often from the American past) than there are Americans doing so ... [in spite of] the fact that the rest of their lives is not in complete synchrony with the referential world that first gave birth to these songs.'² Having read *Time* travel writer Pico Iyer's account of this outlandish Philippine predilection for mimicking American popular music, Arjun Appadurai can thus describe the Philippines in this ironic fashion: as 'a nation of make-believe Americans, who tolerated for so long a leading lady who played the piano while the slums of Manila expanded and decayed'.³ *Évita* meets *Les Misérables*.

To be sure, Appadurai's point in bringing up the case of Filipinos singing American songs would appear to be completely opposite to that of airing the video of the Marcoses singing 'We are the World'. The running images of the Marcoses' cultural repertoire and collections

(besides the shoes, there were the tacky lesser art works by Western masters) are meant to hammer in the egregiousness of the Marcoses' fantasy world, the pernicious implications of their derivative desires for and imitative performances of Western glamour and enlightenment.⁴ Appadurai's point, in contrast, is to argue that beyond the one-sided story of global 'Americanization', within which Filipino 'mimicry' could only be a sign of domination, there is the much more complex story of global cultural flows and exchanges, within which such imitative renditions can also be seen as a form/agency, perhaps even resistance. Both illustrative uses of the Philippines, however, deploy third world dreams for the ironic critique of power. For the mainstream international media, the ironies of ruling third world dreams serve a critique of despotic power (irony reveals deception). For Appadurai, the ironies of subordinate third world dreams serve a critique of the masses' supposed lack of power and, correspondingly, a critique of Western hegemonic power (irony reveals agency). In both cases, however, while showcasing the blurred boundaries between Western and third world dreams, irony as critique creates an interpretative boundary between dreamers and analysts, between those who dream and those who unpack the meanings and consequences of their dreamings. I will say more about the political pitfalls of irony towards the end of this book. Here I have no intention of offering a 'reality' contrary to the above representations. In foregrounding their rather generic form, I merely want to open up another purview, one that recognizes that these representations are forms of dreaming too. More importantly, I want to suggest that this division of effort wedged by irony attests to something other than a reinvention of the division between ideology and critical consciousness. The efforts to represent the ironies of others' dreams attest to the new importance of dreams and imagination in today's world.

Indeed, this is the larger point of Appadurai's Philippine example. As he writes, 'The world we live in today is characterized by a new role for the imagination in social life.'⁵ Imagination has become socialized, entered the everyday life of ordinary people. No longer confined either to the sacrosanct realms of art, myth and ritual or to the reactive realm of ideology or to the space of individual desire (the last two for which Appadurai reserves the term *fantasy*), imagination

has become a central force in the creation of new social projects. As he writes:

No longer mere fantasy (opium for the masses whose real work is elsewhere), no longer simple escape (from a world defined principally by more concrete purposes and structures), no longer elite pastime (thus not relevant to the lives of ordinary people), and no longer mere contemplation (irrelevant for new forms of desire and subjectivity), the imagination has become an organized field of social practices, a form of work (in the sense of both labor and culturally organized practice), and a form of negotiation between sites of agency (individuals) and globally defined fields of possibility ... The imagination is now central to all forms of agency, is itself a social fact, and is the key component of the new global order.⁶

While I quite agree with this concept of imagination as a form of work and as a form of negotiation of agency, that is, as *culturally organized social practice*, I am less persuaded by the modernist account of imagination's abrupt historical emergence as a new social force.⁷

My own inclination is to understand the social force of imagination as having a longer history.⁸ If imagination has come to the attention of social analysts as a new social fact, it is because it has for a long while now been at work in what would appear to be more material practices of economic production and state power. We have only to look at the history of the capitalization of people's dreams in the cinema (as a precursor of the Internet) to see that social imagination has been part of production for quite some time now.⁹ We also need to look no farther than the makings of modern nations to recognize that imagination has also long been part of the organization of communities and their subjection to the powers of the state. My point is that imagination, as culturally organized social practice, is an intrinsic, constitutive part of political economy. Capitalism and state rule, and not only nationalism, are suffused with imagination. Unless we think that political and economic structures are the sole invention of those in power, it makes important sense to see the social force of imagination at work in these 'structural realities' before its expression in recent, more visible 'culturalist' forms such as ethnic nationalism and the active construction of new *dispos* identities through electronic media.

I say all this because if imagination has only now entered the everyday social life of people, in particular, of third world peoples, then they — we — have only been collectively dreaming the dreams of others, trapped in their imagination of us and our worlds. Or perhaps we have not been dreaming at all and, instead, have lived in the rote mythographies of our given social identities. It would seem even that our imaginations were confined by the boundaries of our political territory. And now that globalization has arrived, and (some) people have immediate access to other lived imaginaries through new telecommunicational technologies and increased labour migration, we are all of a sudden imagining for ourselves, creatively dreaming beyond our nation-bound imaginations (if not re-inventing them) and exerting that dreaming on the world in ways that we had never done before. I do not doubt that there have been shifts in the organization of the world, and that these shifts are at once expressed and brought about by new forms of social imagination. But to my mind the 'newness' of imagination is to be found in its relative autonomization from other realms of social life rather than its socialization. If anything, social imagination has become increasingly appropriatively privatized, codified as a cultural database, invested in and fought over as patentable because expropriateable property. Whence the 'new' — that is, changed — importance and agency of dreams.¹⁰

The tawdry dreams of the Marcoses to be equivalent with world power ('We are the World') as well as the dreams of 'ordinary' Filipinos singing American songs, apparently nostalgic for a world they never lost,¹¹ are deeply implicated in the dreamwork of the capitalist interstate world-system. Such dreams are symbolic enactments of practices of imagination that effectively operate in and as the political and economic organization of the Philippine nation-state. If we understand imagination as a form of work, we must see that it is work that is incorporated into a system of production of universal value.¹² In this aspect, that is, in its role in a global system of production, the material imagination constituting the Philippine nation can be seen as a form of labour. Inasmuch as the Philippines is, as a supplier of global labour, a constitutive part of the world-system, its material dreams are the consequences of — as well as bear consequences for — that international order of political and economic dreamwork, which I call

fantasy-production. 'Fantasy-production' denotes the imaginary of a regime of accumulation and representation of universal value, under the sway of which capitalist nations organize themselves individually and collectively in the 'system' of the Free World. While it would seem paradoxical to use the word 'system' to describe an order of 'freedom', I do so not in order to substitute one totalizing fantasy of selective freedom with another totalizing fantasy of absolute constraint but rather to suggest the level at which the scattered and seemingly arbitrary or anarchic actions of different nation-states achieve some measure of coordination and logical coherence to constitute a working international order (or, a form of governmentality). I use 'system' to highlight the effective horizon or field of possibilities within which the social imaginations of whole nations are generated, nurtured and confined. The dreams of Filipinos, rulers and ruled, cannot be understood apart from the global material imaginary, this dominant field of reality, on which they play out. To cast these dreams as the expressions of autonomous, self-contained Filipino subjects (whether they aspire to or resist world power) is to ignore the global order of dreamwork in which the international media system, the source of many of our interpretative representations of the world, plays a constitutive and paradigmatic role.¹³

When I speak of dreams, I use the term loosely to indicate that our actions are also wishes, the expression of which is constrained by the unconscious or, more accurately, imaginary structures and logics of organization of our material realities. In my usage, fantasies are the hegemonic forms of expression of our desiring-actions. Dreams are the concrete work of imagination while fantasies are the abstract forms into which this work becomes subsumed within the world-system of production. Fantasies are, on this view, alienated means of production, while the desiring-actions in dreams are living labour. As Marx explains the relation, 'the means of production appear *éminemment* as the effective form of capital confronting living labour. And they now manifest themselves moreover as the rule of past, dead labour over the living.'¹⁴ Inasmuch as this process of subsumption is never fully successful, that is to say to the extent that our dreams are never fully captured by fantasy-production but are also shaped by other logics whose calling they heed, dreams will always exceed fantasies. However,

to the extent that dreams fuel and further the logics of the dominant global order, they perform the work of fantasies.

This book is about the practices of fantasy-production on the part of the Philippine nation and the contributions of this particular postcolonial national formation to global systemic transformations leading to the establishment of the New World Order, the international division of labour and organization of multinational capitalist production that emerges at the end of the Cold-War. In this book I propose to view the political and economic strategies of the Philippine nation-state as part of the dream-work of an international order of production founded upon the conjoined, if sometimes contradictory, logics of nationalism and multinational capitalism. Fantasy-production names this international order of desiring-actions on the part of nations, an order in which gender, sexuality and race are constitutive principles of organization as well as practical effects.

Fantasy-production practices create a common imaginary geography and history — that of the Free World — as the ground of their operation. In the multinational era of the New World Order, this common ground is the scene of the International (community) and its privileged acting figure is the territorial nation-state. In the transnational era of globalization, that common ground has become the place of the Global (network) and its privileged acting figure, deterritorialized capital-flows.

Even if the new, deterritorialized global order appears to be a de-subjectivized one (with 'economies' now replacing 'nations'), it nevertheless depends on and mobilizes the subjectifying operations of signification fundamental to the older, territorial world order. As I will show, what are now widely-accepted conditions of a radically transformed global order are reconfigurations of dominant strategies of the nation-state, which is accommodating to changes that it has itself been instrumental in bringing about.¹⁵ This is in itself not new. In the so-called postcolonial world, the nation has long been the agent and product of inter- as well as trans-national affairs (whether conceived as imperialist or not). This book's focus on the Philippines enables us to see what the transformative processes of globalization, such as 'denationalization' and deterritorialization, might look like on the side of the imaginary of a postcolonial nation and what they might entail

in terms of the resources of that nation. It also allows us to understand the ways in which the nationally-inflected actions of a 'minor' country such as the Philippines contribute to an order that apparently transcends and takes precedence over it. It allows us to seriously consider the achievement of global capitalism from the perspective of the work of imagination on the side of a third world nation and its seemingly nation-bound people.

When Partha Chatterjee argues that we, the once- (and yet-) colonized, must claim 'our freedom of imagination', he is not arguing only for the present and the future but also and primarily for the past.¹⁶ From the perspective of transnationalism, nations are precisely things of the past. To inquire into the imaginations of postcolonial nations in the moment before the establishment of the New World Order, the moment of inauguration of globalization, is to probe into the immediate and still living pasts of this hegemonic global present in order to find the forgotten creative labour of other dreams. More, it is to free this forgotten creative labour in our own presents so that we may imagine the world differently.

METHODS OF DREAM INTERPRETATION

In order to probe the imaginary dimensions of the political and economic relations and practices of the Philippine nation-state, and in particular the organizing significance of the logics of gender, race and sexuality in these material relations, I have taken critical resource in a number of theoretical discourses. As the above discussion demonstrates, I draw much of my understanding of the 'work' and 'labour' of imagination and dreams from Marxist accounts of the subsumption and alienation of labour under the capitalist mode of production. However, in this endeavour I have also run up against the obstinate refusal of more orthodox Marxisms to factor in the categories of gender, race and sexuality in their conceptualizations of capitalist social relations and, consequently, the limits posed by their political imaginations of social change.¹⁷ It is for this reason that while I rely heavily on the analytical framework of Marxism to make my critique of the capitalist forms structuring Philippine dreams, I have also drawn on other theories,

which attend more closely to the imaginary dimensions of social life and political struggle.

I make use, for example, of some conceptual instruments of psychoanalytic theory in order to render the subjective dynamics enacted on the arena of international exchanges. The concept of 'fantasy' that I employ here derives from Slavoj Žižek who merges the two theoretical discourses of Marxism and psychoanalysis to arrive at an understanding of ideology as 'an (unconscious) fantasy structuring our social reality itself'.¹⁸ Fantasy is a field of symbolically structured meaning (the unconscious) that shapes and regulates our desires, our modes of acting 'in reality'. In its historical, concrete expression it is an imaginary framework that subsists within actual material practice. The 'illusion' is thus not on the side of ideas, consciousness and belief, that is, on the side of 'knowing', but rather, as Žižek would say, on the side of 'doing'.¹⁹ This concept of ideological fantasy allows us to view the 'work of imagination' in the seemingly objective practices and structures of political economy that determine as well as comprise much of the social life and modern history of nations. Fantasy is thus not 'thought divorced from projects and actions'.²⁰ Rather, 'it is belief which is radically exterior, embodied in the practical, effective procedure of people'.²¹

My own reliance on the concept of fantasy and other concepts drawn from psychoanalysis is not, however an application of psychoanalytic theory to the field of international relations. As many scholars have argued, psychoanalysis emerged out of the same historical conditions that gave rise to imperialism. Or put more forcefully, psychoanalysis is as much a product and instrument of this history of imperialism as it is a theory of its subjects. This has not led me to dismiss its analytical power any more than I would dismiss the analytical power of Marxist social theory. Rather, it leads me to recognize the worldly role that such theories (or at least their 'applications') play in the practical shaping of social forms.²² Or, seen differently, this acknowledgement of psychoanalysis's historicity allows me to understand its objects and logics (i.e., desiring subjects and the dynamics of libidinal forces) not only as resulting from historically contingent and finite social formations. These objects and logics are also to be seen as discursive product-effects of the coding practices of

psychoanalysis, which can now be deployed as technologies to shape, even engineer, not only the social formations out of which they emerge but other social formations as well.

Understanding the socio-historical 'origins' of both psychoanalysis and Marxism allows me to view their analytical operations as also historical, social technologies operating in the world. Or, as I put it in Chapter 2, it means viewing metropolitan theoretical regimes as forces of production and instruments of stratification that peripheral social formations such as the Philippines have historically been subjected to. Unlike Žižek then, I do not see the logic of subjectification, which he argues underlies the constitution of particular historical fantasies and identifications, as obtaining transhistorically.²³ Instead, I see that this onto-logic obtains within and is delimited by the historical time of modern imperialism. Now, when this history begins and when it ends is by no means an undisputed matter. My own view is that, in global temporal terms, this history begins in the late nineteenth-century with the decline in power of the previous world empires of Spain and Portugal and the rigidly hierarchical form of territorial colonial rule that they were exemplary realizations of. This beginning is also signaled by the rise of the US empire, which excelled in the new form of colonial rule, characterized by the central role of capital in the social and political organization of its colonial possessions. While a major geopolitical shift occurred after the Second World War and the emergence of the Cold War, the history of modern imperialism can be said to have continued throughout the twentieth century and to only now approach some closure (at least on the geopolitical scale of the international order).²⁴

What I call fantasy-production is a mode of production and signification whose history approximates this history of imperialism that I have sketched. Elsewhere, I discuss the beginnings of this 'oedipalization' of nations in the late nineteenth century, by which I mean the process of symbolic constitution of nations as modern subjects with the imperialist rivalry of Western powers.²⁵ In this dreamwork of imperialism one can see the early makings of the 'sexual economies' of the postcolonial, free world system. I would however argue that the logic of subjectification and order of desiring-actions, which I analyze here, begins to formally 'govern' the organization and

practice of individual nation-states with the decolonization of Asia and Africa after the Second World War. Geonomically, the mode of production and signification of the Free World fantasy appears as the regulatory ideal and strategy of 'development' propagated and pursued by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (both institutions established in 1944). Politically, it appears as the structure and ideal of an international juridical order represented and implemented by the United Nations.

Recognizing the historicity of fantasy-production in its worldly compass goes hand in hand with recognizing the same for its constitutive subjective dynamics. Feminist, anti-racist, multiculturalist and postcolonial social theories have been crucial in this regard, all challenging the universal and ontological pretensions of dominant cultures and their role in maintaining oppressive social orders. I rely on much of this work — the work for example of Gayatri Spivak, Maria Mies, Angela Davis, Teresa de Lauretis and Donna Haraway — to critique the cultural logics of subjectivity and social relations that obtain in national and international political and economic structures. These social theories have greatly contributed to our understanding of the dominant workings of gender, race and sexuality in the structuring of social relations, not only on the level of individuals but also on the level of large social collectivities such as nations.

My own interpretation of the role of gender, race and sexuality as organizing principles of political and economic practice within and among nation-states depends on an understanding of capitalist production and state power as, among other things, systems of signification.²⁶ Gender, race and sexuality are categories for signifying, by way of organizing, social relations of power and production. While they would appear to be only secondary effects of meaning of practical, material relations, in this book I view the logics of gender, race and sexuality as intrinsic to those practical, material relations. Systems of production entail and act as particular modes of representation and codes of signification, which in turn serve as media of dreams and desires.²⁷ As Arturo Escobar similarly argues about the system of capitalist production emerging out of Europe, 'the Western economy must be seen as an institution composed of systems of production, power, and signification. The three systems, which coalesced at the end

of the eighteenth century, are inextricably linked to the development of capitalism and modernity. They should be seen as cultural forms through which human beings are made into producing subjects. The economy is not only, or even principally, a material entity. It is above all a cultural production, a way of producing human subjects and social orders of a certain kind.²⁹ *Fantasy-production* views the forms and dynamics of subjectivity produced and operating through contemporary international politics and economics as emerging precisely out of dominant cultures of imperialism. Besides the 'orientalism in economics' that persists in the world project of 'development', logics of patriarchy, sexism, homophobia and racism deeply inform and are generated by the practices of accumulation and power of postcolonial nation-states acceding to the tacit rules of the world system.³⁰

In her discussion of the prevailing dichotomy 'between the "realpolitical" non-West and the "imaginative" West,' Rey Chow argues: 'since the West owns not only the components but also the codes of fantasy, the non-West is deprived not only of the control of industrial and commercial productions, but of imaginary productions as well.'³¹ Like Chow, I too foreground the subjective dramas of the 'non-West' — here, the Philippines — in an attempt to 'tip the balance' of this asymmetrical relation. I would only want to emphasize that while the West owns the codes of fantasy, the non-West is no less an active and willing participant in the hegemonic modes of imaginary production that are predicated on these codes. In their 'realpolitical' actions, postcolonial nation-states of the non-West demonstrate that they have acquired a certain fluency in these codes of fantasy of the West, making full use of them in the pursuit of their elites' desires but at the expense of the 'freedom of imagination' of the majority of their peoples. My point is not to deny the fact that the non-West has many dreams of its own. It is, rather, to decry the fact that, as Ngugi wa Thiong'o puts it, 'A post-colonial state often crushes those dreams and turns people's lives into nightmares.'³²

To offer a glimpse of the early work of Philippine fantasy-production, let me turn to the example of Carlos P. Romulo, the most prominent Philippine statesman involved in the world project of the United Nations. Romulo made his first appearance on the world stage as aide-de-camp to US General Douglas MacArthur, in the dramatic

fulfilment of MacArthur's 'I shall return' promise to liberate the Philippines from Japanese occupation on the shores of Leyte in 1944. In his first speech to the US Congress in 1944, Romulo, now Resident Commissioner of the Philippines to the United States paid 'tribute to that unknown soldier and those like him who had carried the first principles of Americanism into the Philippines'.³² Romulo presumed to speak for the entire nation and its dreams when he spoke:

Mr Speaker, twenty-eight years ago today, upon this floor, America gave its first pledge of freedom to the people of the Philippines.

On that day the Congress of the United States approved the Jones Act, promising independence to the subject Philippines in a covenant that is without parallel in the world's history.

It is not my purpose to review the Filipinos' fight against America during the early days of American occupation, nor stress the fact that it took the United States three and a half years of actual fighting to subdue the Philippines. We were not conquered in the final analysis, by guns, but by the practical demonstration in the Philippines of America's concept of democracy. American teachers brought us new methods of education. Public health, road building, government training — such things were given us. Gradually our feeling toward America changed from resentment and suspicion to confidence and loyalty.

That loyalty was sealed by the passage of the Jones Act ...

The Jones Act was our victory. You let us win it upon this floor. It was a pledge made, and America has kept that pledge ...

We Filipinos, too, kept the pledge. You gave us the Jones Act. We gave you Bataan. For, Bataan and Corregidor were dividends paid back out of our loyalty and our faith in America ...

On that bloodstained Philippine peninsula Americans and Filipinos must meet over a common grave where lie the bodies of their sons ...

We will meet, my fellow Americans, over that common grave. Out of that grave, a dream.

Others have died for that dream of world recognition of the ordinary civilities and the divine rights of man.³³

Romulo went on to enumerate those who have died for this universal dream expressively fulfilled by the example of American democracy:

Jesus, Abraham Lincoln, the first Filipino President under the US Commonwealth, Manuel Quezon, and 'a boy named Jose, from Manila, and another boy named Joe, from Missouri' who died for this same dream on the peninsula of Bataan. This speech was one of the first of many that Romulo would give to rally US support for Philippine 'independence' and 'democracy'.

In this speech one can glean many of the characteristic conceits of the dominant fantasy of US-Philippine relations in play by 1944: the mutual covenant consisting of bilateral exchanges of American 'freedom' for Philippine 'territory', the upholding of 'America's concept of democracy' as a universal good, the Philippines' fraternal loyalty to and faith in the US as reciprocity for the 'gift' of independence, and the essential identity of Filipino and American dreams. In Romulo's narrative, moreover, we see the dominant interpretation of the messy and violent history of US-Philippine relations. In this fantasy, the good conquest of the Philippines by American democracy leads to the mutual recognition of and struggle for shared ideals expressed in the two countries uniting forces against the Japanese during the Pacific war. Anti-colonial Filipino struggles culminate in the passage of the Jones Act, the realization of which would coincide with the fulfillment of a historical destiny. Romulo's narrative fantasy is not only a revision of a more troublesome Philippine history of violent colonial oppression and revolutionary Filipino desires in the pacific terms of American understanding ('for only Americans could comprehend the democratic dreams of our Filipino leaders').³⁴ It is also a willful prophecy, the guiding logic of Romulo's future practical accomplishments and actions in the sphere of world politics. 'Out of that grave, a dream.'

By the end of the Second World War, the Philippines was indeed already materially 'pledged' to the US. Despite the provision for Philippine independence in 1946 outlined in the 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Law, for which anti-imperialist, protectionist and racist forces in the US had lobbied, the Philippines still figured in the US's postwar vision of a new international order. Two concerns were at the forefront of this vision: economic prosperity and political security. In the Philippines, those two concerns were addressed through the passage of several mutual treaties: the Bell Trade Act, the Military Bases Agreement and the Military Assistance Pact. The issues of free trade

and security, moreover, were very closely tied. They were the continuing proof of Philippine 'loyalty and faith to America', collateral for the granting of 'freedom'.

The passage of the Bell Trade Act in 1946 guaranteed the continuation of the 'free trade' agreements of the Commonwealth period, which had provided for the unlimited, tariff-free Philippine importation of US manufactured goods and for the limited, exclusive export of Philippine agricultural products (sugar, tobacco, coconut oil, hemp) to the US. The Bell Trade Act legislated the continuation of these asymmetrical exchange relations beyond Philippine independence. Such 'free trade' had already served to enrich and entrench a native ruling class eager to collaborate with the former colonizer as well as US corporations invested in local industries and thus had served to destroy local, subsistence economies in favor of the cash crops of the agricultural export economy.³⁵ The Bell Trade Act also granted American investors and corporations the same economic privileges and rights as Filipino citizens to own and exploit Philippine natural resources by means of a coerced amendment to the 1935 Philippine constitution, called the Parity Amendment.³⁶ This amendment as well as the provision tying the Philippine Peso to the US Dollar were 'designed to make American capital feel at home in the Philippines'.³⁷ Besides these economic dividends, there were also territorial dividends to be paid to America for so-called Philippine independence and the shared dream of democracy. The Military Bases Agreement (1947) and the Military Assistance Pact (1947) provided for, respectively, the establishment of US military bases on Philippine territory for 99 years and US military aid and logistical, technical and intelligence assistance to the Philippine military. Thus were the post-war bilateral 'special relations' between the US and the Philippines established and the 'mutual covenant' realized. These relations became the basis for long-standing fraternal collaborations between Filipino elite rulers and US economic and political forces, collaborations that have robbed and continue to rob Filipinos of true freedom over their historical fate.

Throughout these developments, Romulo played the role of mediator between the Philippines and the US, in all his diplomatic actions helping to realize the common destiny of the two countries that he espoused. Not only was Romulo a signatory of the United Nations

Charter (1945), he also served as President of the General Assembly (1949–50), as Philippine Ambassador to the United States (1952–1962), and as Secretary of Foreign Affairs under arguably the two most egregiously corrupt administrations in the history of the Philippine Republic, that of Elpidio Quirino (1948–1953) and Ferdinand Marcos (1966–1986). In these different capacities, Romulo negotiated agreement after agreement, settlement after settlement between the Philippines and the US, securing the guarantees of mutually-benefiting ties between the two governments: from war reparations to rent for the military bases, from a trade agreement that expanded 'parity rights' to encompass all Philippine industries (The Revised Bell Trade Act, 1954) to a treaty that continues to ensure joint US-Philippine military operations, from chronic US financial loans and aid, which underwrote rampant rent-seeking in the Philippine government, to a regional military security pact (SEATO, 1954), which supported the Cold War aims of the US.³⁸ By serving as the middleman of these bilateral transactions, Romulo was not only fulfilling the fantasy of US-Philippine relations that he had so affectingly spoke about in his speech to the US congress. In mediating regional and world political-military cooperation (besides being instrumental in the passage of SEATO, Romulo was twice President of the UN Security Council in 1957 and 1980), he was also helping to lay down the geopolitical foundations for the present-day fantasy of the Asia Pacific community (See Chapter 1).

In his Pulitzer Prize-winning autobiographical works, Romulo writes of 'the immortal seed of heroes' that runs through his Filipino veins, 'the mark of [his] manhood, the symbol of [his] dignity as a human being'. He writes of the fraternal bonds between Filipinos and Americans and the deep primordial satisfaction of American sportsmanship and fair play that became a part of his practice of diplomacy. And he writes of his own personal struggle to be treated with respect and dignity as the micro-instance of the struggle of his country to be treated 'as a full-fledged nation' on the world stage. The particular masculinist character that Romulo offers in these narratives as representative of the nation demonstrates precisely the gendered subjective dynamics of international relations that he, in his capacity as Philippine statesman, helped to play out. That is to say, while this

masculinist posturing would seem to be merely a matter of individual disposition, it is in fact the subjective effect and regulative ideal of the system of political and economic relations characterizing post-Second World War Philippines. Politically, the Philippines was now a formally independent, sovereign nation, and a founding member of the fraternity of free nations represented by the United Nations. Economically, it was an underdeveloped neo-colony seeking competitive advantages in an inter-capitalist state system dominated by the political-militarist and economic world power, the US. The Philippine nation-state was in other words now a minor player in the Free World, which meant maneuvering within an international field of normative political and economic actions that hold particular dominant gendered assumptions and implications. It is against this field that we must view Romulo's expressed symbolic and subjective ideals of Philippine nationhood.

Put simply, the symbolic and subjective ideals performed by Romulo are instruments for the mobilization of the material institutions — foreign loans, financial and military aid, state power, a supranational juridical order and international trade agreements — that such ideals were important codes for organizing. In this respect, Romulo's nationalism was a mode of imagination that actively maintained and indeed helped to internationalize the codes of fantasy of the Free World. I am not saying that this state nationalism did not pose difficulties and resistances to US interests, for any review of the history of the post-Second World War period will show the uneven, acrimonious and violent processes through which state power was consolidated and bilateral 'agreements' were achieved.³⁹ However, it is precisely by working with the codes of the Free World ('parity', 'free trade', national and regional 'security', and later, economic 'protection' and 'controls'), that is, by trading in the symbolic and material currency of an emergent international community of exchange, that the Philippine nation-state contributes to the effective hold and crushing effect of such fantasy-scenarios on the rest of the nation's dreams.

To illustrate: the Philippines' formal political status as a free and sovereign nation and economic status as an independent national economy were the bargaining means by which conditions for bolstering competitive local powers and capital were secured. In exchange for 'freely' offering Philippine territory and military forces to the project

of the Cold War (for example, heeding Romulo's advice, President Quirino sent 5,000 Philippine troops to contribute to US forces in the Korean war), the Philippine state consistently received not only political and military backing but also large financial remunerations that became the basis of long-standing rent-seeking clientelist relations between the Philippines and the US and between the Philippine state and local elites. In exchange for 'parity' rights and other privileges accorded US businesses, local elites secured their monopolies of agricultural export industries, through which peasant workers came to be increasingly exploited. When unrestricted free trade combined with massive deficit spending brought about a serious foreign exchange crisis, nationalism became once more the means of instituting a system of import and exchange controls (1949–1961). These controls, however, only served to bolster luxury goods manufacturing industries and to increase sites of graft and corruption. The limits to industrial growth set by a dependence on subsidized imported capital goods and raw materials as well as the unabated corruption of state-connected businesses caused another balance-of-payments crisis that was answered with US and IMF-sponsored policies of renewed free trade and decontrol and the devaluation of the peso (1962–1972).⁴⁰ In turn, deepening social crises and labour unrest fueled growing militant activist and revolutionary movements, which led to US support for the dictatorial regime of Ferdinand Marcos (1972–1986).

While this brief outline makes quick summary of what were very complex and convoluted historical developments, I merely want to point out that throughout these changes in national policy, the ideals of 'sovereignty', 'security' and 'development' were not simply bandied about but rather put to real work by representatives of the Filipino polity. That is to say, the Philippine state's deployment and manipulation of the codes of international fantasy has fundamentally enabled the systemic exploitation and oppression of the great majority of Filipino lives. One might argue that the codes themselves have no agency and that it is the capitalist world-system and the rapacious dreams of its ruling elites that have wrought the nightmare lives countless Filipinos have lived and continue to live. My own view, however, is that such codes of fantasy are crucial components of the world-system and the rapacious and tawdry dreams of its third world despots like the

Marcoses. They are not the indifferent means of autonomous motive agencies. They also exercise a captivating material power over our practical imaginations. Thus at this moment when I write, as the marauding US state pressures the United Nations to take pre-emptive military action against Iraq, the Deputy Speaker of the Philippine Congress, Raul Gonzalez, cites UN Security Council provisions of international military cooperation to direct the role of the Philippine nation-state in the impending war. As Gonzalez said in behalf of the Philippine state, 'This country does not want war and prays for peace, but if war is inevitable and the UN supports it, we must abide by its treaty obligations.'⁴¹ The alienation of the very codes of international fantasy embodied in the UN that the Philippines itself had helped to found and extend is what allows these treaty obligations to delimit the possibilities of Philippine action to such disastrous ends. Moreover, as the rest of this book will show, to the extent that the organizing codes (as alienated social agencies) are themselves informed by logics of gender, race and sexuality, their practical invocation and mobilization will bear particular consequences for the social groups they implicate. On this view, the masculinist and fraternal ideals held by Romulo as he participated in laying down the geopolitical foundations for the present-day fantasy of the Asia Pacific are important in accounting for the inordinate burden that Filipino women have had to bear for their nation's role in the world.

This book thus takes as its central concern the gendering, racializing and sexualizing significance and consequence of the practical deployment of the codes of the Free World fantasy in Philippine politics and economics in the contemporary period. In order to offer an understanding of the dynamics of Philippine fantasy-production, I look at a broad range of phenomena characterizing the contemporary national formation of the Philippines, including the prostitution economy, the mass migration overseas of domestic workers, urban restructuring and the popular revolt deposing the Marcos dictatorship, as well as representational works of art, poetry, historical narrative and film, which try to intervene in these social conditions. I analyze how the normative scenarios and practical and ideal categories of fantasy-production (e.g. 'development' and 'growth', economic 'interests' and political 'security', 'dependence' and 'sovereignty', etc.) significantly

shape the subjective and social meanings and effects of these very different kinds of activities and, further, how they delimit the possibilities of historical transformative agency within the forms of dreaming they allow. In this way, I delineate the contours of the dominant national imaginary impelling and regulating the transformation of the Philippine economy from a prostitution industry to a domestic labour export industry, as well as the transformation of the Philippine state from an authoritarian, crony capitalist state to a putatively liberal-economic, elite-democratic one.

While it would appear that this fantasy-production I refer to is a unitary system governed by a single, evolutionary logic of progression (precisely what I claim it is not but rather how the world is represented to be and enjoined to behave), I intend neither to diminish nor to ignore all the mishaps, internal conflicts, failed as well as successful resistances, differentiations, singularities and sheer chaos and contingency that fill and animate the very movements out of which such a fantasy-history is erected. Much of this book is devoted precisely to the debris of fantasy-production, by which I mean the inassimilable remainders of its operation, and to their potential for steering history away from its present victors. In the first section, for example, my examination of the crisis management role of the nation-state discloses some of the social powers beyond its control (the powers that it in fact is at pains to control). Nevertheless, I feel it is equally important, precisely in the very affirmation of these missed potentials, to delineate the points of their capture. To dwell a little while on the horizon of their vanishing helps us remember what we must wrestle with and for whom (a whom, I should add, that is not fully there beforehand, that is inseparable from the struggle for its liberative realization).

There is more to this reiterative act than political commemoration. *Re-staging the unitary and evolutionary terms of fantasy-production* helps to delineate the unsurpassed limits of present imaginaries, many of them now under the sway of what Anna Tsing calls 'globalist fantasies'.⁴² Fantasy-production practices depend on a transcendent field of meaningful action, which they are the very process of materializing. This field, conceived in an earlier moment through the notion of 'the international community' and re-conceived in the present moment through the notion of 'global networks', is founded first in

the physical, substantial presence of the earth, and then in the seemingly immaterial (increasingly 'wireless') but nevertheless still substantial presence of global communication systems. Generated by the very same practices that make it the invisible or rather vanishing ground of their operation, this field consists of a universal, space-time coordinate system (a secularist spatio-temporal order) that continues to go virtually unchallenged as the locating system for all real, practical, political and/or economic action, not to mention the basis of any world, or at least worldly, history.⁴³ It is this abstract system for synchronizing and charting planetary-time with global geopolitical space — a vanishing field for the operations of the global market as well as international politics — that enables fantasy-production practices to be business as usual.

⁴² 'Today', particularly for the emerging global middle class, the fantasy of the free world has become as transparent or unremarkable as the languages of its production, organization and dissemination. By transparent I mean the categories and operations of the free world have lost their visibility as ideals and projects. To too many they have become nothing more than the vehicles and rules of global traffic — sheer means — for what would appear to be unquestionably vital and desirable exchanges. In this book, I highlight the ways in which categories such as the nation, the state, bodies and flows serve as figurative media of world-production. These figures are more than conceptual tools. They are social technologies created out of the very practices they are used to describe.⁴⁴ Just as feminized 'bodies' and the integrity attributed to them are produced out of the 'penetration' of the national economy (as itself a consolidated territorial entity) by foreign capital investments, so is the national 'state' produced out of the practices of 'negotiation' with its local and international counterparts.⁴⁵ Similarly, the fluidity later attributed to such bodies (in migrant 'flows' and 'brain drain' movements as well as 'floating populations' in 'seas of development') can be viewed as the effect of subsequent political and economic strategies of 'channelling' adopted to supercede state strategies of 'containment'.

Although it would seem, judging from the predominant language of globalist fantasy-production, that juridical subject-forms are now outmoded forms, this book shows that such conceits of so-called 'older'

for 'advanced' societies, which are said to be surpassed by new post-industrial forms of organization, are still very much present. They are redeployed in national contexts such as the Philippines as instrumental bids to transnational inclusion (sometimes inadequately understood as third world adoptions of the structures of Western modernity), as when the government or business community present themselves as 'partners' to Western nations in the project of world development.⁴⁶ And they are redeployed in the global context as partial, flexible means of negotiating power and accumulating capital.⁴⁷ Like the nation-state, 'bodies' and 'subjects' have not so much disappeared as much as lost their prior, foundational guarantees. This 'freeing up' of older categories allows some 'others' to claim what might have been once unequivocally denied them (subjectivity), thereby requiring greater and greater violence to make the remaining, as well new, 'others' perform what is still an essential material conceit (bodies) for the operation of power. My discussion of the post-industrial corporeal racialization of Filipina domestic workers, in Chapter 3, speaks directly to this point.

This book argues that the fantasies of a postcolonial nation like the Philippines are at once symptomatic of and productive of an international system of desiring-actions among nations. It does not argue that these fantasies are *merely* symptomatic. However, it does make the case for the continuing power of the imaginary of the international capitalist system to shape and set limits to the possible imaginings of the contemporary postcolonial nation-state and its peoples. Unless we seriously interrogate the extent to which even counter-hegemonic movements participate in a dreaming that will ultimately not be ours, we cannot really understand or harness the cultural resources for other kinds of dreaming that we have at our disposal.

At the same time, Fantasy Production views dreaming-actions of dominant political agencies such as the state as the product of a continuing struggle with contending forces from below. All the social texts I discuss show the power of people's desires to impel actions on the part of the state and state apparatuses. Indeed, much of the book is devoted to viewing the contradictory demands that these dominant agencies have to accommodate precisely in order to pursue their interests. That these contradictions show themselves in pathologized

forms of 'gender trouble' -- as in the 'bulimic' behaviour of the post-authoritarian metropolitan government, which I discuss in Chapter 2 -- is precisely the consequence of the normative gender and sexuality logics on which the fantasy-practices of the Philippine nation-state are predicated.

This book offers then not only a critique of fantasy-production but also a pursuit of alternative imaginaries and the unorthodox possibilities for historical change that they might bear. While I begin with an ideological critique of fantasy-production and the rules of its history, I also begin to move towards another kind of cultural analysis and history, one that is not fully caught in the experience of necessity or expediency but rather takes the risk of faith in possibility. To this end, I attempt to theorize and demonstrate the importance of following dreaming practices that tangentially escape the logic of desiring subjects, for the writing and making of other histories.

Like the notion of marginality, tangentiality refers to what is essential to the governmental power of prevailing orders but falls from its valorizing purview. Unlike marginality, however, tangentiality does not designate positions, places or identities, whose prior and continuing exclusion from fields of power is the instrument and effect of the logic of domination. It does not designate, in other words, the product-objects of a productive repression. It refers rather, to forces and movements that are harnessed to comprise the substantive content of universal structures (such as 'the nation'), but, at every point on the boundaries of which, tend elsewhere, at once exceeding and falling short of their universal function.⁴⁸ What I refer to as tangential, then, are the collective dream forces and movements that are harnessed for the construction of hegemonic subjects and their counter-hegemonic opposition, and yet escape the universal and universalizing forms of both.

To give an example from the book, against the hegemonic 'strong man' regime of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos (1972-1986), which engineered the 'prostitution' economy of the nation and the 'feminization' of Philippine labour, rose the counter-hegemonic 'feminine' popular uprising symbolically led by Corazon Aquino (see Chapter 5). However, between these two antagonistic representative subjects of the nation, whose dramatic confrontation in the televised

event of the 1986 EDSA revolution' made national and international 'history'; we can see, in the phenomenal mass following of the film actress, Nora Aunor, an emerging social movement, coursing through but tangential to both. To my thinking, the subjective inventions of Nora's mass following, which consisted almost exclusively of lower-class women, helped set the stage for the people's performance of power, which deposed the Marcos regime. These life-inventions of disenfranchised women provided primary resources for the reorganization of labour under the subsequent government of Aquino, which oversaw the nationalization of the domestic labour export industry. As I will argue in the last chapter, it is the capture of the heretical, 'feminine' power of this tangential social movement figured by the persona of Nora Aunor that fuels and shapes the foundation of a new national as well as global political economic order via the production of a new sociality — domestic labour.

The emergence of this tangential social movement (as Foucault reminds us, emergence 'always occurs in the interstice') is not, however, a spontaneous and pure self-presencing of 'the people'.⁴⁹ It is the by-product of the constitutive contradictions of fantasy-production claiming the privileged place of its dreaming, in this case, the revolting community represented by Aquino taking the place of the state. Tangential movements are, in this way, the unruly product (and unrecognized mediator) of dialectical struggle.⁵⁰ However, they are also what fall away from 'history' as it has dialectically come to be.⁵¹

'Following' such movements is more than the democratic restoration of diversity and heterogeneity to the world. Both furthering and diverging from secularist, critical realist histories that see this restoration as their end, I propose heretical visions in pursuit of impeded histories as well as histories yet to be made. Such visionary pursuits are not impelled by utopian hope. Rather, they are the liberating, creative acts of an impossible yet mundane faith. If cultural criticism is to participate in the sway of history in directions tangential to the dominant aims of fantasy-production, it must heed the wayward dream-acts of living social movements, such as Filipinas dreaming new tastes, trying out new lives. *Fantasy-Production* thus ends by exploring the potential of such dream-acts to serve as the practical and theoretical means of a liberative rephrasing of history.

PART I

Fantasy-Production

Bodily Resources and Libidinal Dynamics of National Crisis and Development

There is a story that I first heard in the Philippines a long while back.¹ It goes something like this: Do you know the origins of the American national anthem? Well, when José Rizal (the Philippine national hero) went to the United States, he wanted to watch that all-American game, baseball. But when he got to the stadium there were no more seats left. The only place to watch the game from was at the top of the flagpole. So he took it. Seeing how high up he was, the Americans stood up and sang out to him, 'José, can you see?'

From this facetious account of origins can be gleaned some of the operative features of the dominant fantasies of the postcolonial Philippine nation. In this particular postcolonial fantasy we see a reworking of the subjective predications of the neo-colonial relations between the Philippines and the US. In radically misconstruing the hegemonic account of the origins of US nationalism, the joke surreptitiously invokes a counter-narrative that in many ways correctly places the Philippines at the origins of modern 'America'. Offhand, one can read the joke's absurd substitution of Rizal for the US flag and its location of the origin of the US national anthem in a perversion of colonial history (formally expressed in the 'American' mispronunciation of José) as a mockery of 'American' patriotism and its originary power. The ridiculous picture of Rizal, 'The First Filipino', balancing on top the flagpole like a monkey, as early US colonizers thought Filipinos to be, can also be seen as a mockery of Rizal whose legitimacy as the national hero has been put to question in the last few decades in part because of allegations that he was propped up to serve US interests.² The joke hence functions as a disguised defiance of 'America's' authority over the determination of Philippine national identity. Parodying the US's histrionic concern for its 'little brown brother', whose 'littleness' has always meant inexperience, weakness and inferiority and, to that extent, has always served as a legitimization for US rule, it overturns the imaginary conditions of US neo-colonial power. But the mockery of Rizal is also a mockery of 'the Filipino' and the character of his 'special relation' to 'America'.³

Indeed, what is crucial about this joke is its portrayal of the imaginary reality of US-Philippine relations. The scene is terribly familiar: 'the Filipino' hoping and trying to find his/her place in the heart of 'America', and finally finding recognition in a most ignoble

fashion. But it is not only self-depreciation that is demonstrated in this joke. Equally critical is the transfer of that national self-depreciation onto the US, for the latent truth of this representation is that the Philippines functions as an unacknowledged nodal point of 'American' national identity. The mockery of the Filipino aspiration to be incorporated into the scene of 'American' desire becomes a manifestation (one might say, a manifesto) of the way in which the Philippines serves 'the American Dream', both as a productive colony and an absent presence in the US imaginary. Of the US fantasy, Lauren Berlant writes:

It would be all too easy to ridicule the Dream, and to dismiss it as the motivating false consciousness of national/capitalist culture. But the fantasy of the American Dream is an important one to learn from. A popular form of political optimism, it fuses private fortune with that of the nation: it promises that if you invest your energies in work and family-making, the nation will secure the broader social and economic conditions in which your labor can gain value and your life can be lived with dignity.⁴

The Philippines has served this US fantasy to the extent that its labour, its natural and social resources, its territory and its symbolic presence, together with those of other US colonies and territories, have served to guarantee precisely those social and economic conditions promised by 'America'. The political, economic and ideological value produced by the Philippines and other US colonial possessions for the US nation throughout the twentieth-century is inestimable. Despite the ideological assertion that it was more trouble than it was worth, we have only to mention a few of its services to get a sense of the Philippines's importance to US interests: a source of agricultural products (sugar, hemp, coconut, log, minerals); a market for US goods; a source of cheap imported agricultural labour (for agricultural industries in California and Hawaii); a territory for the largest US military bases outside of the North American continent (a launching pad for US intervention in Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War; a stronghold of Cold War 'security'); a site of overseas investment of industrial and finance capital, as well as a site of expenditure of military surplus capital and technology (a site of constant counter-insurgent military activity); and a dumping ground of excess goods and toxic waste. It has also

served the US by bearing the burden of its erasure as a constitutive condition and contradiction of US values and freedoms.⁵ The joke thus restores to full visibility a presence perceived as an absence or 'lack'.

The fantastic reversal performed by the joke (it is not we who want you but, rather, you who want us) is in fact the truth of the fantasy of US-Philippine relations, a demonstration of the ideological dreamwork, which upholds actual US-Philippine relations. Filipinos want to partake of 'the American Dream', when in fact they are already a constitutive part of that dream. As I will discuss at length in Chapter I, that dream, which constitutively shapes US ideological, political and economic 'greatness' as a national superpower, begins in the late nineteenth century as the dream of empire, and then transforms by mid-twentieth century into the dream of the (First) Free (Enterprise) World (against the socialist challenge of the Second World). It is a dream that has deep historical underpinnings and broad regional reach. Thus, in the Taiwan context, Kuan-hsing Chen writes, 'After the Second World War, the material power of the US made it the central object of identification, and later dis-identification, as the neocolonial master of the region. American systems of representation and modes of living infiltrated the space of the national-popular imaginary, and redirected its flows of psychic desire and cultural energy. This chain of movements still traverses the social body.'⁶

Reversing the direction of influence, the joke is not therefore on 'us' (the *petit* US) but on the US, whose identity as a bona fide nation (indeed, as the highest instance of democratic and sovereign nationhood — a superpower) is shown to depend on the figure and strivings of the absurd nation. That claim is the tendentious dimension of the joke. Of course the national absurdity that is the Philippines, as the historical mascot of the Free World in Asia, is precisely the ~~constitutive, contradictory consequence of the workings of US~~ imperialist desire — in a word, its symptom. Perpetually striving and failing to realize the ideals of freedom, equality, sovereignty and progress defined by and as the US, the Philippines is the embodiment of the blocked fulfillment of these ideals within the prevailing, global fantasy. In this way the Philippines has served as an intractable object of US (as well as Philippine) desire — the object of countless projects of aid, development, modernization and structural readjustment, all of which

have resulted in the unabated crisis that is the Philippine economy and government, and the unimpeded growth of US multinational capital and political power.

The fantasy-scenario of the joke above is thus a symbolic expression and effected framework of 'real' political and economic relations between the Philippines and the US in the neo-colonial moment (1946–1972). Fantasy is not, as in the Althusserian sense, the imaginary representation of real material practices but, rather, the symbolic-material practices that organize what we take to be 'reality'. It is already this 'reality', in other words, that is profoundly imaginary, by which I mean, suffused with subjectifying meanings and effects of dominant orders of signification. As the purported ground of international affairs, political and economic structures and relations assume form and force in thoroughly subjective and subjectifying ways. Hence to speak, for example, of national desires is not to speak metaphorically of what are essentially political and economic interests of a nation. It is to grasp the subjective predicates and subjectifying effects of the actual practices that produce those interests (political power and economic wealth) attributable to individual nations, or their dominant, representative agencies. Put differently, it is to grasp the ways in which nations are invoked and behooved to act as unitary, individual subjects on the world-scene. 'Fantasy-production' is an attempt to think of these imaginary dimensions of political economy, that is, of structures of production and power on national as well as international scales. It names a socio-symbolic logic or dreamwork obtaining in the organization of the international community and the scene of its exchanges (the affairs of the world market and international relations).

Most political and economic scholarly works on the Philippines ~~have no time for dreams or fantasies~~. If they do have time for dreams and fantasies, they are cast as the illusory possessions of individual men who have shaped the destiny of their nation with their desires. As for the means with which those men purportedly shape their nation's destiny, the political and economic 'systems' they manipulate to feed those dreams, those are simply the hardware of modern nationhood and development. Culture, as software, is brought in only to account for the failure of that hardware to produce in the Philippines the same

structures of representational democracy and rational economic growth that it produced in advanced, metropolitan nation-states. This book argues, however, that cultural imagination, dreams and fantasies subsist and operate precisely in such political and economic hardware. As Arturo Escobar's cogent and comprehensive critique of the discourse and practice of 'development' shows, in rational techniques and strategies of national planning, in international programs promoting economic growth and sustainable subsistence production and in the institutional practices of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, are the workings of a dream.⁷ That dream, which Escobar traces to the triumphant post-Second World War US's willful vision that 'the American dream of peace and abundance be extended to all the peoples of the planet', was predicated on the invention of a problem (Third World poverty) for which a whole array of practices, apparatuses, institutions arose as necessary solutions.⁸ This imaginary or dreamwork of 'development' produces not only an object for its desiring-actions (the Third World or the underdeveloped world) but also a subject of these actions (the First World or the developed world). *Fantasy-Production* focuses on this subjective dimension of the practical affairs of 'development' in the context of the Philippines and in particular on the role of race, gender and sexuality in the organization of those affairs. By recognizing not merely the discursive constructedness of the political and economic relations established as worldly realities, but also the *desiring* or libidinal character of these relations, we are able to better understand the constitutive significance of race, gender and sexuality in the practical making of the Philippines's contemporary worldly realities.

The dream of 'development' has an easily discernible historical precedent in the imperialist fantasies of a previous age. In these earlier fantasies, the role of gender and sexuality in the structuring of relations is evident. As Anne McClintock describes them: 'In these fantasies, the world is feminized and spatially spread for male exploration, then reassembled and deployed in the interests of massive imperial power.'⁹ Needless to say, the hetero-masculine imperial power is also a white (that is, unmarked) national subject in constitutive symbolic identification with Progress, which takes the place of God as the new universal mandate.¹⁰ Today's world inherits these subjective relations

and their principles of constitution in the geopolitical imagination that governs international relations. That is to say, the principles of race, gender and sexuality that constituted and were effected by imperialistic relations continue to operate in the material organization of the Free World. They do so through the practical pursuit of such universal ideals as 'development', 'national sovereignty', 'security', 'the international community' and 'global civil society', which comprise some of the subjectifying categories and conceits of the international dreamwork that I am calling fantasy-production. Although anti-colonial and other liberatory social movements brought and continue to bring new and tremendous forces and practices of desire into the world, these are constantly – even if never fully – subsumed by forms of fantasy, which shift to accommodate and recodify the radical potential of such movements in conservative ideals.

Caught within this international dreamwork, how then do postcolonial nations dream of themselves? While the critique of imperialist and developmentalist fantasies may elucidate the dreams of metropolitan powers, alone it says little about the dreams of the countries that figure as their objects. On the other hand, too often the response to such critiques has been to affirm Third World and postcolonial resistance at the cost of diminishing the violence of their subjection to and active participation in such fantasies. It is also, I believe, too easy to separate out the elites and the masses or the state and the people and then to blame the first for complicity with the dreams of power and to free the latter of responsibility for the consequences of those dreams. I do not see myself as fully escaping these tendencies. I do however attempt to direct my analytical focus away from pre-constituted social actors and onto the practices of fantasy-production that give rise to the social relations through which such social actors are constituted. That is to say, I try to view particular social subjects (the state, the national elite, the people) and their characteristic agency as also the effects (and not simply the sources or causes) of dominant dreaming practices.

From this view, which recognizes a dominant field of practices, a 'common material imaginary', shared by first world and third world nations alike, we can attend to the *kinds* of dreaming engaged in by both that effectively produces prevailing social and economic conditions

on a world scale. My own interest is in the particular ways that the Philippine nation participates in the dreamwork of the Free World.

As an order of signification and production, the Free World fantasy consists of certain scenarios, categories and moves that delimit even as they spur practical forms of action on the part of designated actors. (It is in this regard neither a single narrative nor a unified logic of unfolding, whether evolutionary or otherwise.) Nationhood, sovereignty, development, modernity, democracy and progress are just such practical-ideal notions guiding official state projects as well as popular struggles against them. These practical-ideal notions carry with them particular assumptions of subjectivity as well as subjectifying consequences that have become dominant to the extent that the hegemonic cultures they emerge out of determine the main contents of fantasy-production. It is not at all surprising then to find the processes of their enactment imbued with expressions of desire and lack, love and disaffection, pride and shame and dignity and debasement. National dilemmas are subjective predicaments. Observe the way in which the problem of the US bases and the 'debt crisis' of the late 1980s are posed by then Senator Joseph Estrada as he addresses 'the heart of our national predicament — the lack of national sovereignty':

Mr President, the current debate over US military bases in the Philippines clearly revolves around two things: money or freedom?

... We are once more being tempted by this occasion to renounce our national identity in order to lessen, in whatever way, the severe depression of our national economy ...

We don't think of the future. In our actions one can trace the pitiful happiness of a slave — who permits and hopes that another human will carry him. It's alien to the dream of a slave that he should use his own powers ...

We confront numerous possibilities, but it's a reflection of our weak self-determination as a government that we cannot show any evidence of our well-considered preparation for a life without military bases. This is perhaps the reason why the Americans are not worried about current negotiations, nor do they show the slightest anxiety (sic). They see the Aquino government as bluffing. I'm afraid if we don't change our perspective and posture

toward these bases, it will be a foregone conclusion that we will not get anything from these talks — neither money nor freedom ...

The crisis that afflicts us is also the chance to discover our native powers. In our power lies our authentic nationhood. In our hands lies our freedom. In unity lies the honor of the country.

Let us not exchange our national honor for the silver of the foreigners.

Money or freedom — this is the choice that confronts a country that can see itself behaving like a bond-slave, a country whose freedom (our national honor) is exchanged for the silver dollars of its US master. The language of this appeal, whereby the nation's sovereignty is compromised as a consequence of its selling of itself (in other appeals, of its people), articulates and is shaped by the subjective categories and social forms that organize the real, political and economic context in which such an appeal is made. In other words, the explicit invocation of slavery and the implicit suggestion of prostitution in Estrada's speech are part and parcel of the fantasy-practices that produce those metaphorical allusions as actual, historical conditions obtaining in the Philippines. These conditions are exemplified by the state-sponsored prostitution industry that both dominated and paradigmatically structured the Philippine economy during the Marcos dictatorship. Fantasy-practices are, however, also the symbolic means of materially transforming such conditions. Money or freedom — this subjective 'choice' is re-enacted over and over again in the quotidian as well as world-historical struggles of Filipinos. Indeed, Estrada's speech came in the wake of the 1986 'People Power' revolt against the Marcos dictatorship, the symbolic phrasings and affective energy of which undoubtedly helped to shape Estrada's anti-US bases appeal just as the subjective performance of 'the people' in that revolt also paved the way for the mass appeal of his presidency. That first revolt took on many of the gendered and sexualized meanings of Philippine fantasy-production and staged them in a polar antagonism between the 'feminine' figure of Corazon Aquino and the 'strongman' figure of Ferdinand Marcos.

In the most recent 'People Power' uprising, now touted as the sequel to the first (i.e., 'People Power 2'), this scenario is replayed but in a new configuration. Now, no longer freedom-fighting Senator but

money or freedom
Fulcrum

rather corruption-ridden President, Estrada became (for the politicized middle class which emerged out of 'People Power 1') the despised embodiment of tainted money that needed to be renounced for the redemption of Filipino 'honour'. And in a graffiti drawing, which circulated widely on e-mail as part of the popular protest, his avid supporter, Senator Tessie Aquino-Oreta, became depicted as the 'money-hungry/dick-sucking whore' who mirrored the decadence and immorality of the Estrada state. Needless to say, the gender and sexuality entailments of this fantasy-scenario have grave consequences for the social groups they implicate, such as women. One of the concerns of this book is to foreground these conditions of violence shaped by the organizing tropes of Philippine fantasy-production.

This first section describes the dominant fantasy-scenarios structuring prevailing political and economic conditions of Philippine social life in the post-Third World era. Very importantly, it focuses on the gendered and sexualized meanings and effects of the actions on the part of peoples and states over which such scenarios exercise significant, determining power. In Chapter 1, 'Sexual Economies', I look at how prostitution becomes the organizing trope and actual state-sponsored industry of the Philippine economy during the period of Ferdinand Marcos's authoritarian regime. As I demonstrate at length in this chapter, this is not only a matter of nationalism taking on gendered and sexualized meanings.¹¹ The gendered lineaments and sexualized contents of this mode of production also constitute its practical dynamics. I argue that the international organization of capital and labour, which takes hold at this particular moment, depends on a heteronormative logic of gender and sexuality for the configuration of national political relations and strategies of economic structuring.¹²

In Chapter 2, 'Metropolitan Dreams', I show how the same contradictory dynamics of gender and sexuality that shape Philippine political economy are at work in the restructuring of the built environment of the national capital, Metro Manila, and can be read in the strategies of the state governing this metropolitan transformation. I argue that the flyovers, or overpasses, constructed in the early 1990s are new metropolitan forms designed to address the crisis of the aftermath of the Marcos regime which emerged with the deposing of that regime by popular revolt in 1986. These materially concrete

structures are technologies of metropolitan desire that help to produce, simultaneously, the transnationalizing national subject, the bodies to be regulated in the name and as the property of that subject, and the new 'democratic' state replacing the Marcos dictatorship as the negotiating agent of this transaction. I also discuss the subsequent transformation of this new metropolitan form and its realization of a new national subject: 'civil society'.

In Chapter 3, 'Domestic Bodies', these transformations are viewed in relation to the deterritorialization of the nation enacted by the mass exodus of Filipina domestic workers. We can detect the early stirrings of 'civil society' in the reconstitution of the nation vis-à-vis the tragic figuration of this overseas domestic body as modern day slaves. Slavery reappears in the Free World as a refurbished technology of social relations supporting new, post-industrial forms of expropriation of surplus value. I try to show the historical proximity of slavery to the dominant form of femininity supporting state-sponsored prostitution in order to account for the particular kinds of labour relations racially engendered by the export of Philippine domestic labour during the subsequent period. I also suggest that the processes of gendered racialization that obtain in these new domestic labour conditions serve as the violent means by which a nascent global, postcolonial middle class tries to attain the unmarked, universal 'humanity' historically denied them. While the expansion of this export industry induces a crisis in the nation as a consequence of its bodily dispossession (and the dispossession of its territorial power), it also bolsters a new economic nationalism that helps to reconfigure the role of the Philippine state in the global economy.

Conclusion: Hope

In Donna Haraway's critical description of the tropic role of the gene in the reality games of technoscience — the gene as 'the alpha and omega of the secular salvation drama of life itself' — we can recognize the workings of much larger units of human life.¹ Nations, states, peoples, cultures — these are the privileged authors of and actors in the dramas of the present world, the things-in-themselves shaping destinies in our times. Not open futures, just a fixed array of possible outcomes. Like genes, replicators travelling across evolutionary time in living organisms as their bodily vehicles, nations, states, peoples and cultures are the subjects dreaming us.

There appears to be a mistake. Us humans, the agents *par excellence* of a universal modernity, the object of these abstract things' dreams? Indeed, there is a 'mistake' but one proper and fundamental to the global capitalist world we live in: fetishism. As Haraway puts it, 'Fetishism is about interesting "mistakes" — really denials — where a fixed thing substitutes for the doings of power-differentiated lively beings on which and on whom, in my view, everything actually depends.'² This practice of 'mistaking', here, principally, geopolitical and social categories as real, self-moving, acting entities, is not of course a matter of false consciousness, any more than the national and international dreams that *Fantasy-Production* tracks are mere illusions. Marx discussed fetishism as a practical operation crucial to the functioning of the system of capitalist exchange and not merely as an ideological effect of that system. As William Pietz writes of money and

capital, nations, states and peoples are representational forms of material social relations that have become *universal*: 'they are fetishes insofar as they have become necessary functional parts that are privileged command-control points of a working system of social reproduction'.³ It is the hold of political and economic *realities* (for the increasingly pragmatic, worldly citizens of the present, the real itself) over all our lives — the power of command they exercise over our practical imaginations of the possibilities and limits of social organization and collective happiness — that makes for the fact that nations, states, peoples, not to mention money and capital, are dreaming us.

Describing the 'belittling' view of Pacific islands and peoples with which he once wholeheartedly agreed and even participated in propagating, seemingly based as it was 'on irrefutable evidence, on the reality of our existence', Epeli Hau'ofa expresses the bleakness of the prevailing geopolitical-economic realist perspective for his community: 'What hope was there for us?' If indeed we — those of us who share in the daily indignities, unacknowledged pain and monumental violence that the realities of our countries' and our peoples' 'smallness' spell for us — are in dreams not of our own making, how can we dream other (our own?) dreams? What hope is there for us?

I find Haraway's irreverent, critical joking approach towards 'life itself' — the seemingly non-tropic, purely referential world of natural reproduction encapsulated by the gene — to provide a great measure of relief from the relentless reality-dreaming in which we are caught. Her 'diffraction' of the concrete facts of nature can be seen as a theoretical supplement to practices of other dreaming, which invisibly shape and yet might transform the 'real world' that serves as the place of our commandment.⁴ Replacing the terrain of technoscientific fetishism, 'life itself', with a notion of 'liveliness', where 'contingency, finitude and difference' inhere, Haraway reminds us who ply the terrain of geopolitical-economic fetishism not only of the inescapably imaginary, figurative dimension of even the most 'serious' (scientific) claims of reality.⁵ She reminds us, following this realization, also of the (cultural) conventionality and mutability of the shapes that that 'hard' reality takes. In these reminders we glean some glimmer of hope.

It is of course true that a simple, voluntarist will-to-thinking

differently will not change the facts. Political scientists and economists are aware that nation-states and national economies are analytical categories. They themselves periodically remind each other of the dangers of hypostasizing such concepts, and yet ... They know very well that these are conceptual categories and yet they nevertheless refer to them as if they were real things in order to account for the facts. That is to say, in analytical practice they exercise the very belief that they theoretically disavow. What is this curious balancing act between theoretical knowledge and practical belief if not the very act of fetishism? While this analytical act is what helps to produce the facts, it does not do so either on its own or outside of the world it takes as its object. Fetishism is not simply hypostasization. Political science and economic discourses that attempt to provide an adequate theoretical account (a map of correspondence) for the way things are in the dominant terms of their organization only serve to support the actual social practices that make for this institutionalized reality.⁶ My point here is that while the material world is profoundly imaginary, acts of analytical imagination and theoretical invention will have material effect only to the extent that they are connected to worldly social practices.

It is for these reasons that I do not see 'critical consciousness' or, for that matter, any idealist instantiations of counter-imaginings and oppositional fantasies to be adequate sources or means of hope. Instead of aspiring for new dreams, new romances, to reshape our real worlds, we can begin living creatively, acting differently, making other worlds to found new dreams.

But I have not yet said what I mean by hope. At the opening of the People's Plan 21, a gathering of people's organizations from all over the Asia Pacific region, held in Japan in 1989, Muto Ichiyo announced: 'The slogan at the beginning of the twentieth century was progress. The cry at the end of the twentieth century is survival. The call for the next century is hope.'⁷ Against the images of 'progress' and 'development' where people have placed their desires, Muto sees a new picture of the world forming out of the interactions of people's movements. In the actual movements of Asia-Pacific peoples, indigenous peoples, women and ecological activists, he sees not the romantic dream but rather the practice of alternative futures. He witnesses 'people-to-people relations' regulating the economy in place of relationships between things

regulating the relationships between human beings. What he calls the Alliance of Hope does not rest on the system of states that I have argued constitutes the very imaginary field of fantasy-production. The Alliance of Hope is made possible by 'peopleness', which is the living, dynamic relations of cooperation and interaction among peoples in struggle, working across and through their differences without eschewing them:

Peopleness is not an idealist construct. It is what is actually at work in the existing solidarity movements among seemingly very different groups of people. It is what is behind the real sympathy and compassion for other people's struggles. It is what is behind the sacrifices being made for the people's cause everywhere. Denying the working of peopleness would be to deny the reality of these movements — or to render them incomprehensible. Peopleness represents our radical equality and our equal radicality.⁸

Departing from twentieth-century approaches to real social change, which were predicated on the seizure of state power, Muto sees in these movements a new kind of hope that does not rest on a remote future but rather on a possible future in the here and now: 'When social movements start changing the existing relationships here and now, they are already building an alternative society here and now.'⁹

My own sense of hope is close to Muto's. Hope to me lies in the daily exercise of our creative capacities to remake the world, in the acts of living in ways that depart from the orthodox dreams of our world-historical, real-politik time. It means, as I argued in the last chapter, both faith and knowledge against the regime of belief that presently reigns over the 'free' world. While Muto attends to the actions of organized social movements, I find that his insights apply not only to them but also to the broad range of actions on the part of socialities-in-the-making, that is, on *de facto* social movements seeking routes of escape from the fantasy structures of dominant orders. It is for this reason that I have argued in this book for cultural criticism coming under the sway of the non-realist logics guiding and created by the tangential and heretical pursuits of love, happiness, freedom and possibility embodied in these *de facto* social movements. To get caught up in the unorthodox faithful actions of others, including our own, has been my call.

I began *Fantasy Production* by gesturing towards the limits of irony as a mode of critique and the borders that it sets up in the very process of putting them in question. Haraway similarly points to the reassuring and normalizing effect of the 'comic' mode, which 'does not recognize any contradictions that cannot be resolved, any tragedy or disaster that cannot be healed'.¹⁰ Far from abandoning the comic mode, Haraway persists in it without, however, restoring its implied harmonies. Letting the contradictions stand as a practice of producing difference in the world, instead of self-sameness, and situating her own claims in intimate relations with the worlds she criticizes but continues to deeply care about, Haraway's method reads as 'feminist irony', which Naomi Schor defines as 'an irony peeled off from fetishism'.¹¹ In much of this book, I have attempted to put this 'feminist irony' into practice. It can be heard in the tone I adopt when speaking about 'prostitution' and 'slavery', calling the Philippines 'she', referring to the entire nation as a 'symptom' of American as well as global capital desire. I am practicing 'feminist irony' when I mimic these fantasy categories and the syntax of their racialized, gendered and sexualized phrasings but at the same time foreground the social contradictions on which they depend. I am practicing 'feminist irony' when I perform the fantasy-critique of this place called the Philippines without being able to remove myself from it and its consequences. I am, after all, one of those consequences. But more than that, it is of great consequence to me — it is a place which continues to shape my life, a place with which I have absolutely vital, living, material relationships, a place that remains a source, a means and an end of many of my most passionate attachments.

It is in light of the devastating masculinist implications of ironic critique, which I discussed in the previous chapter, that I have come to recognize the great importance of what I would call feminist hope, a hope that is at work in the practice of 'feminist irony' but that also goes beyond this practice. This hope is precisely that creative acting on faith exemplified by people power and the heresy of Filipina women leaving their homes. It is what cultural criticism would do well to be moved by in the making of its claims. In the face of an expanding global regime of pervasive cynicism and revanchist belief, I see the political need for intellectual producers to make faithful claims. Faithful claims enact and extend desiring movements that escape the debilitating, life-

taking dreams of the New World Order. They are creative acts that 'follow' — pursue, supplement, submit to — other life-mandates coursing through history; other practices of imagination that are already making the world different or making different worlds out of this one by defying the orthodox truths of fantasy-production.

In 'following' the heretical actions of others, we cannot, however, assume that these actions constitute an *a priori* 'correct' political course or strategy. To do so would be to romanticize the people and their spontaneous philosophy in ways that have proven disastrous at other places and other times. Our claims must be our own even as they are in concert with others. And as we need knowledge as much as we need faith, knowledge (as the product of 'critical consciousness') must be part of our claims, which cannot only act under the sway of others' claims but rather must also exert a sway on others. Balibar's interpretation of the significance of Althusser's conception of ideology might well apply here. As he writes, 'Very much in the line of Gramsci's notion of "hegemony", it [Althusser's conception] implies that the importance of "science" in revolutionary practice is not so much to "explain reality", even less to forecast future history, but above all to transform the masses' ideology, therefore the proletariat's own ideology.'¹² I would only add that 'we', who are on the side of 'science', and the knowledge we proffer cannot remain detached from that transformation we hope will take place in others. 'We' and the particular mode of critical thought that defines 'us' must be in the very process of transformation that we would expect of the people with whom we find ourselves intimately, painfully and promisingly linked. Let me quote Muto once more:

Interactions, if properly stimulated and organized, can cause mutually liberatory changes in the practices and cultures of the communities involved and the community with a modified internal culture, by deepening its understanding of the partner communities, will certainly improve its relationships with them. This is what I would call an alliance building process. When this unraveling of the imposed mutual relationships occurs inducing internal transformation, we already see a process of an alliance of hope being built. As is obvious, this is a dynamic, ever-self-renewing, cross-fertilization process. But isn't this a mere wishful thinking?

In fact, it is not. The Alliance of Hope building process is partly a description of what is happening on a significant scale and partly a new context whereby what is happening is to be understood and oriented.¹³

The knowledge we produce has to be informed by the heterodox logics of people's liberative actions and pursuits. Otherwise, while we seek to change prevailing dreams, we decline the transformation of our own practices of imagination.

In this book I have tried to 'follow' the re-imaginings of the nation and the world that are already happening in order to expand the horizon of my own truth-claims about the Philippines and the global order within which it is placed. While I have endeavoured to hold on to and heed the particularities of Philippine life, which I at once intimately know and am far away from, I have also learned to heed claims and ways of struggle in other social contexts, which I have come to know. I have learned that to change prevailing social relations here and now means to directly address the cultural logics of difference that organize them — to address racism, sexism and homophobia in their everyday social effects and actions. It means to attend to the cultural resources that people have drawn upon and invented in their daily struggle to prevail over the small and grave, intermittent and relentless acts of repression, debasement and dispossession directed against them. This attention has, in my view, been one of the most important contributions of the movements of multiculturalism and their demands for and claims of heterogeneity, diversity and difference.

At the same time, to make a different world here and now means to peel these cultural resources from the structures of fantasy-production that subsume them, including categories of national or social 'identity', possessive subjectivity and representational democracy. To make culture matter beyond 'culturalism' we have to take seriously the role of cultural practices of imagination in the material production and organization of our given worlds and, moreover, to put those practices to work in the creation of new political and economic forms of collective life. Such vital work depends on the freeing of our imaginations from the hold of existing realities, which naturalize the presence and necessity of all the apparatuses of social regulation and

expropriation supporting the global order, from states and prisons to military forces and labour markets.¹⁴ It is in this spirit that Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong'o dedicates his work with 'the message of my hope for a world without prisons and detention camps. It is the hope, in other words, for a world which will have eliminated the necessity of prisons, detention camps, the army, and police barracks, in short, eliminated the conditions which make the state as we have known it necessary in the organization of human life.'¹⁵ As I have suggested, that freeing is already happening in the actions of people dreaming other worlds. The predicament for many of us is how to grasp and be theoretically swayed by those dreams and, furthermore, communicate in them to others. I have only begun in this book to suggest ways of doing so, ways of reconceptualizing people's historical agency by recourse to the languages of their transformative actions.

If it is true that the present world experiences 'not so much a scarcity of hope and imagination but an unbounded incommensurability of hope between different regions and cultural spaces', then it seems to me that the task of intellectual work is to participate in bringing those different regions and cultural spaces into conversation with one another.¹⁶ If fantasy-production sets veritable limits to what of other dreams it is possible to convey, then we are enjoined to actively create, together with other cultural producers, new figurative means, new inter-cultural languages, by which some of that incommensurability of hope might be bridged.

In the present dire context of global war, we are called upon to bear vital witness to other dreams against and beyond the current global-US fantasy of world security, which returns with a vengeance to the shores of anti-imperialist Filipino struggle. In April 2002, at a teach-in, cultural protest and activist congress called 'Culture Against War: Philippines on the Axis of Empire', several hundred others and I experienced a radical hope that already spans great cultural distances.¹⁷ This event was organized by a multicultural group of students, activists and teachers as a public counter-cultural stance to the dominant culture of war supporting the joint US-Philippine military deployments in the Southern Philippines. Both the process of organizing the event and the event itself were powerful testimonies to the lively imaginations that are moving to make new worlds of socially just and joyful communities.

A new generation of politicized, culturally creative youth here in the US joined music, rhythms, images and words with new and older generations of revolutionary struggle in the Philippines to make faithful claims to an 'axis of resistance' that exceeds the geopolitical coordinates of the global-militarist crusade. In the inspiring cultural performances of JUICE, a multicultural student guerilla theater troupe at the University of California at Santa Cruz, the Bay Area cultural activist band Diskarte Namin, the hip-hop artists Kiwi and DJ Owl Boogie, other independent artists and cultural performers and in the congress of activist organizations that followed, I heard new languages, new feelings and new social relations being created that celebrated and practiced peoples' power and peoples' love against the pieties of patriotism everywhere extolled and against the state powers to which all feeling for human life is required to pay tribute.

While this protest dream-action was a small one, it nevertheless heeds a call to which so many innumerable others have also responded and continue to respond, a call that people have, by means of their faithful actions, themselves 'caused'. In these acts of hope and in the unorthodox ways that people are speaking their tangential dreams to one another and being swayed by each other's claims, we bear active witness to a new heresy in the making. No miracles, just hope.

*Walang himala! Tayo ang gumagawa ng himala!*¹⁸